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Marriage in Western European societies has been a mechanism 
by which two individuals are joined in a socially recognized 
union, as well as the institution through which legitimate 
families are formed. But it is also an institution for cementing 
ties between already formed families. The choice of marriage 
partners is therefore of interest to more than just the bride 
and g room. Because of its crucial role in structuring society, in 
forming alliances and in delineating kinship groups, the choice 
of marriage partners, so-called "marriage formation” is a pos­
sible area of conflict among different parties.1
Marriage, in all human societies, usually occurs between 
individuals belonging to socially endogomous groups. People tend 
to marry those who they and society perceive as being socially 
like them, from the same or continguous socio-economic back­
grounds. But there are always important exceptions to this 
dicta. Despite all formal constraints individuals will always be 
found who will violate social standards for the quite personal 
reason of sexual attraction. A society’s reactions to these 
exceptions helps to explain its attitude toward social mobility 
and social change. While few social groups welcome marriage to 
those who are markedly different, their efforts to prevent these 
marriages runs the gamut from lack of action to punitive legisla­
tion. Thus the response to "inappropriate" marriage partners is a 
useful indication of the rigidity or openness of a given social 
system at a particular time as well as a mechanism which can be
used by a social group to protect its internal cohesion. The fol­
lowing study looks at marriage oppositions in late eighteenth 
century Rio de la Plata in an attempt to understand better mar­
riage, colonial society and the role of women.
In Roman Catholic societies marriage is one of the sacraments 
of the Church. As a sacrament, until the end of the eighteenth 
century, the regulation of marriage lay wholely within the legal 
jurisdiction of the bishop and the church courts.2 It was the 
Church, basing its decisions on canon law which decided in cases 
concerning marriage whether a particular couple should be joined 
together. In the regulation of marriage, Church courts were free 
to make their decisions independent of direct civil supervision 
and, for the most part, free of appeals to civil courts as well.3
From the end of the sixteenth century to 1776, the Church in 
Spanish America applied canon law in those cases relating to mar­
riage. . Although marriage was the means by which families were 
joined, central to Roman Catholic law was the belief that mar­
riage could only take place between two people who had freely 
consented to share this sacrament. Indeed the Council of Trent 
decreed that couples had a right to marry of their own will, and 
could do so without parental consent.4 Although parents tried to 
prevent undesirable marriages, the Church consistently held for 
couples, going as far as dispensing the banns so that they could 
marry in spite of parental opposition. Parental objections based 
on economic or ethnic differences between the couple (novios) 
were routinely rejected by ecclesiatical courts. As long as canon 
law impediments did not exist, the Church's policy was pro- 
marital union.5 In 1776, Carlos III, the Bourbon king of Spain, 
issued a Royal Pragmática which changed dramatically both the 
rules and the authority governing marriage.6 Extended to his 
American possession two years later by the Royal Cédula of 7 
April 1778, this legislation represents a radical departure from
previous norms, and demonstrates that the Bourbon reforms 
encompassed more than political and economic change. The Royal 
Pragmática, and succeeding marriage legislation, was indeed an 
attempt to transform social mores at the basic level of marriage 
and kinship formation.7 According to the Pragmàtica, all sub­
jects, "from the highest classes in the State to the lowest sub­
jects, without any exception," were to come under the law, 
although in America "mulatos, blacks, mestizos and members of 
other similar mixed races who are publicly known and reputed as 
such" were to be specifically excluded.
From 1778 on, parental permission, never before required 
under canon law, became the sine qua non of marriage for whites 
(españoles). Moreover any disputes over marriage were now to come 
before a civil court (in most cases the juzgado de alcalde) which 
would rule on whether a marriage could take place; appeal was to 
the Royal Audiencia. Church courts were not only removed from 
most cases involving opposition to marriage, but parish priests 
were strictly enjoined from performing any and all marriages 
without prior parental approval. In addition any person marrying 
in spite of parental opposition was to be immediately disin­
herited in perpetuity. Decision-making power over marriage was 
thereby transferred from the individual exercising his or her own 
free will, and the church, to both the bride and groom’s parents 
and the State.
As important as the redistribution of power enacted by the 
Royal Pragmàtica, was the re-definition of just cause to prevent 
a marriage. Although canon law impediments continued to be valid 
reasons to prevent a marriage, inequality between bride and groom 
was now enshrined as the principal cause for a successful paren­
tal dissent (disenso). If, after a refusal to grant permission to 
marry, a young man or woman chose to bring formal suit against 
the dissenting parent, that parent need only prove inequality 
between the prospective spouses in order to stop the marriage.
The Royal Pragmática was not the first time that the State 
had openly interferred in matters of marriage. The Spanish Crown 
had legislated on matters of marriage concerning Royal 
bureaucrats and military men from the sixteenth century on.8 But 
it was the first time that the entire ’’white” population came 
under direct parental and royal control in these matters. The 
reason for this control was clearly stated in the 1776 Pragmática 
and the 1778 Cédula: "to contain the lack of order which has 
slowly been introduced into society with the passage of time.”
In the eyes of the Bourbon royalists both the Church and young 
people’s individual choice had failed to produce an orderly 
society. It was now time to take important social matters out of 
their hands. Further legislation during the next thirty years 
would only reinforce the new attitude made clear in the 
Pragmática, eventually limiting the jurisdiction of the Church in 
matters concerning engagement (esponsales)t child and wife- 
support, and bigamy.9
In addition to the eighteenth-century desire of the Crown to 
control the Church, Charles Ill’s desire to control that most 
dangerous force, disorder, is clear in the Royal Pragmática. The 
reason for this social disorder is also specified: marriage 
between unequals which had become so frequent as to produce "most 
grevious harm... upsetting the proper ordering of society, and 
[producing] continual friction and damage to families.” In addi­
tion, marriage between unequals were offensive to God because it 
often took place in spite of parental opposition, thereby defying 
"the honor, respect and obedience which children should render to 
their parents in matters of such gravity and importance.” The aim 
of the State was to control what it viewed as a dangerous confu­
sion between social and racial groups. To achieve this, the 1776 
Pragmática made parental permission a pre requisite for any
Sxmnish man or woman younger than twenty-five. The assumption was 
that parents and adult offspring, more aware of the importance of 
marriage and of the dangers produced by unequal unions, would 
behave in a more socially desirable fashion.
It should be stressed that by changing the age at marriage 
from that of canon law (12 for women and 14 for men) to that of 
the Royal Pragmática (25 for both), the new law was essentially 
attempting to control the marriage partner of a small group of 
men, those few who married before reaching the age of majority, 
and of almost all women. In eighteenth century Rio de la Plata it 
was rare for a Spanish woman to reach the age of 25 without 
having "taken state." Most women, somewhere between the age of 
14 and 21 either married or entered a convent.10 Men on the 
other hand tended to marry in their late twenties or beyond, when 
they were economically able to support a wife and family. Setting 
the age at which parental permission was required at 25 and below 
essentially meant that every women now required formal parental 
permission to marry.
Only in 1803 would this bias against women be corrected when 
a new Royal Cédula "on the marriage of a family’s offspring" 
instituted a sliding age scale.11 If his father was alive, a man 
now needed parental permission until the age of 25, a woman until 
the age of 23. If his father was deceased, but his mother alive, 
the m a n ’s age dropped to 24, and the woman’s to 22. For orphaned 
children, if either paternal or maternal grandparents exercised 
parental authority, the age became 23 for the man and 21 for the 
woman. Lastly those under the authority of a tutor could marry at 
22 (man) and 20 (woman). Although the law still discriminated 
against women (mothers having less control than fathers), by 
pushing back the age of consent for females it did free a large 
cohort of women to marry without parental control.
The Crown realized that some parents might refuse to give 
their permission for capricious or irrational reasons, abusing 
the power over their progeny which the law now gave them.
Parents, or those acting in their stead, were encouraged to con­
sent to a marriage unless they had just and rational reasons for 
their opposition. They were also warned not to use this law to 
force an offspring into a marriage that was against the minor’s 
desire or vocation. The 1776 legislation also outlined the proce­
dure to be followed in those cases where the prospective spouses 
chose to challenge parental refusal.
The very existence of parental marriage oppositions, both 
before and after 1776, reflects a degree of personal independence 
on the part of young people of marriageable age. Although most 
marriages were arranged with parental intervention, these cases 
demonstrate that parental control was not a universal practice.
At least some offspring were making their marital choices without 
parental approval.
By custom and tradition the marriage process in colonial 
Argentina, as elsewhere in Spanish America, consisted of four 
steps. First was the bethrothal (palabra de casamiento), the 
spoken words by which a young man promised to marry a young woman 
thereby establishing an espousal relationship. The bethrothal 
could be given with a promise to marry within a stipulated period 
or time, or it could be open-ended. The next step was a visit to 
the local parish priest where the required information on the 
civil status of the future bride and groom (the expediente 
matrimonial) would be gathered. If o n e ’s bethrothed failed to 
move from the first to the second step within a respectable time 
period, the prospective bride could begin a suit for breach of 
promise (esponsales) before the ecclesiastical authorities.
Once the marriage application was completed, and the parish 
priest was convinced that no canonical impediment prevented the
couple from marrying, banns were read, usually on three succes­
sive Sundays, publically announcing the couple’s intention to 
marry. Any additional information relating the possible impedi­
ments was now reported to the parish priest. It was at this point 
that parents, grandparents, guardians or other close kin usually 
refused to give their permission to the planned union. If the 
couple still insisted on marrying, they could petition the court 
of first instance, requesting that the dissenting party be forced 
to present a rational reason for his or her objection to the mar­
riage. In essence the son or daughter who had been refused 
permission became the plaintiff suing his or her parent, the 
defendant.
From 1776 on cases of marital opposition were heard before 
the cabildo court of first instance, the .juzgado del alcalde 
primero or that of the alcalde segundo. Once the Audiencia of 
the Rio de la Plata was founded and functioning in Buenos Aires 
(1785), all cases generated in the cabildo courts of the audien- 
c i a ’s jurisdiction could be appealed to the high court. The 
audiencia was never the court of first instance in marriage dis­
sent proceedings but rather the court which could review and 
override cabildo court decisions.
In theory the new marriage legislation would reestablish 
social order, but what indeed was the reality? A close reading 
of the cases which were generated as a result of the Royal 
Pràgmatica provides us with information on how frequently parents 
actually took advantage of the new legislation to enjoin their 
children from marrying. Moreover the legal cases concerning mar­
riage dissent provide valuable information about which parents 
were more apt to oppose the choice of marriage partners of their 
children, the reasons usually given for their opposition and 
their degree of success. While far from numerous, the marriage
dissent cases give us interesting insights into late eighteenth 
century colonial society, the social perceptions of the colonial 
world, ideas about love, sex and sexuality, and the role of women 
in society.
Cases from the court of first instance were reviewed for two 
contrasting urban areas of colonial Argentina. In addition cases 
heard before the Royal Audiencia were also analysed. The first 
urban area, the city of Córdoba, was a traditional city, the cen­
ter of higher education in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la 
Plata. The city had been closely tied to the mule trade to Potosí 
in the seventeenth century, and had undergone a period of eco­
nomic and demographical stagnation during the first half of the 
eighteenth century.12 Although Córdoba experienced an economic 
and demographic revival under the Viceroyalty, the economic base 
of the city was always too small to support the local population; 
by the mid-eightenth century Córdoba became a net exporter of 
population both to the north (Jujuy) and to the south (Buenos 
Aires). Furthermore while all sectors of the population had grown 
since 1750, the non-white groups had grown most quickly. A city 
of approximately 7,800 inhabitants in 1785, it ’s 2,500 white 
citizens often behaved as though they were under siege from other 
racial groups.
By contrast the port city of Buenos Aires (the major port of 
tÿe Rio de la Plata), had experienced steady economic and 
demographic growth since the middle of the seventeenth century.
A commercial city par excellance, it had been elevated to capital 
of the new Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, thereby taking on 
a host of new administrative functions. In addition the city had 
a sizeable artisan group, and a large sector tied to the process­
ing of hides for export. While there was great inequality of 
wealth in Buenos Aires, the city also provided many opportunities
for the daring and the lucky. According to the evidence provided 
by census and parish records the city’s growing mulato population 
found in relatively easy to move across blurred racial lines.13
How frequently did parental opposition result in legal pro­
ceedings? Opposition to marriage which resulted in litigation 
represented approximately ten percent of all marriages in the 
Córdoba area, while the corresponding figure for Buenos Aires was 
less than one percent.14 Clearly in the older, more traditional 
society there was more conflict between parents and children over 
the issue of marriage.15
There is no way to determine the actual number of colonial 
parents who objected to their offspring's choice of a spouse. 
Legal proceedings contain no information on how many parents suc­
cessfully dissuaded their children from marrying by simple refus­
ing to grant permission. The marriage dissent cases only reflect 
those cases where children chose to challenge their parents’ 
decision. Given other evidence of the power of parents and their 
economic control over sons and daughters, these cases might only 
be the tip of the proverbial iceberg of inter-generational con­
flict. What is nonetheless obvious is that the majority of off­
spring accepted the decision which their parents had made as to 
their marriage plans. Only a stubborn few rejected this decision, 
preferring to bring their parents into court to counter their 
authori t y .
Suing o n e ’s parents, grandparents or guardians was a drastic 
step, especially over a matter as important and far-reaching as 
marriage. The Crown was sensitive to the delicate nature of the 
testimony which might be presented in these cases. It therefore 
enjoined all judges to "avoid defamation of individuals and 
families." Because of the nature of the proceedings secrecy was 
of the essence. Proceedings were to be "always behind closed 
doors."
Although sworn to secrecy, the testimony of several witnesses 
makes it evident that marriage dissent cases quickly became com­
mon knowledge, fueling local gossip with juicy information about 
the family or families in question.16 Because of both the type 
of testimony presented and the legal strategies used, these cases 
were social dynamite because they could lead to an investigation 
of the ethnic background of a family. Few people in colonial 
Argentine society could be sure enough of their social origins to 
weather close scrutiny back three or four generations with con­
fidence. At the very least these cases produced "hateful 
testimony, evidence and legal manoeuvres which are the result of 
the inevitable persistance of the interested parties but which 
usually produce lasting resentment."17 The risks were not to be 
undertaken by the faint-hearted.
Nonetheless several litigants did not stop with the court of 
first instance. They insisted on appealing negative verdicts to 
the Royal Audiencia, prolonging the possibility of public airing 
of family skeletons and dusky progenitors. Of the forty-six cases 
which were brought to appeal before the Buenos Aires Audiencia 
after having first been presented to local cabildo jurisdiction, 
the majority (52 percent) had originated in the Buenos Aires 
cabildo. Next in importance (20 percent) was the northeastern 
sectors of the Viceroyalty (Asunción, Montevideo, Corrientes and 
Santa Fé), followed by the northwest (Mendoza, San Juan,
C a t a m a r c a ) a n d  lastly the Córdoba region.18 The Buenos Aires 
region alone appealed more cases the rest of the entire 
Viceroyalty.
Put. another way, of the 45 cases heard first by the Buenos 
Aires cabildo, slightly over half (53 percent) were appealed to 
the higher court. This evidence of the facility with which local 
residents could and did appeal to the Audiencia reflected the 
relative advantages of living in a city where a High Court was
seated. Indeed before the Audiencia began to function in Buenos 
Aires (1783) not one of the seven marriage dissent cases which 
came before the cabildo were appealed. On the other hand, ninety- 
three percent of the cases tried before the alcaldes of Córdoba 
were never appealed, proof of the difficulty, both in terms of 
time and cost, for people in the cities of the interior to avail 
themselves fully of royal justice. In essence the cabildos of the 
interior cities were far more powerful legal and social arbiters 
than that of Buenos Aires, where quick recourse to a higher court 
was the general rule.
An analysis of the Buenos Aires cases which were appealed to 
the Royal Audiencia, and those which were not, yields some 
provocative insights into the marriage dissent process.19 The 
lower court decisions which preceded the appealed cases were 
almost evenly divided between "racional" (a decision for the 
parents or tutors) and "irracional" (a decision for the couple 
wishing to marry). On the other hand a analysis of those cases 
not appealed presents quite a different pattern. In these cases 
the alcalde’ s decision was always for the engaged couple. In 
other words, while parents were evenly divided among those who 
accepted a decision which they disagreed with and those who 
insisted on pushing ahead to a higher court, young people, more 
determined to marry the partner of their choice, appealed all 
unfavorable decisions to the higher court.
The costs of bringing a marriage opposition suit were rela­
tively high, although the Crown, in an effort to make this legal 
process available to all interested parties, had specified that 
"in these cases, the court is not to charge fees, expenses or any 
emoluments. The parties (involved in litigation) are only to pay 
the moderate and necessary charges for paper and for the scribe’s 
services."20 Cases being appealed to the Royal Audiencia also 
incurred "registration and assignment fees." For those cases
where total costs can be determined, the expenses ranged between 
57 pesos 6 reales and 283 pesos 7 reales, averaging 123 pesos 2 
reales. These costs, although high, did not prevent a wide range 
of litigants from appearing as plaintiff or defendent in marriage 
dissent cases.
As stated earlier, marriage oppositions were the social 
exceptions, not the norm. Nevertheless they illustrate several 
social values, and suggest the nature of late colonial Rio de la 
Plata society, as well as the role of women in that society. In 
the case of Rio de la Plata, plaintiffs, defendants and the 
courts interpreted the vaguely worded Royal edict as referring to 
one of four different types of inequality, that of race, that of 
social background, that of morality, or that of economic posi­
tion .
Given the Spanish obsession about "purity of blood", race, as 
grounds for preventing a marriage comes as no surprise. In 
Córdoba as in Buenos Aires, racial inequality was the major 
reason for parental opposition. In 1791, for example, Pablo 
Beruti, a Buenos Aires notary (escribano) attempted to stop the 
marriage of his son José to Maria Josefa Rocha, daughter of 
another local notary by claiming that the bride’s father was a 
mulato.21 Although the parents of both the prospective bride and 
groom belonged to the same occupational and socio-economic group, 
Beruti argued that the bride and groom were "unequal because of 
blood."
It is important to note that only Negro and not Indian 
ancestry was an acceptable grounds for a marriage opposition 
based on race.22 In addition it was not usually the prospec­
tive bride or groom who was charged with being the source of the 
problem. The original transgressor, the person who had introduced 
the "stain" in the family was usually a mulato grandparent. 
Indirectly these frequent references to one mulato grand-(or even
great-grand-) parent testify to a significant degree of racial 
miscegenation, both inside and outside of marriage during the 
early years of the eighteenth century. In most of the cases the 
parent of the person charged with having a "stain" had succeeded 
in marrying an español, thereby further whitening their line. 
Indeed, if we are to believe the testimony contained in the mar­
riage opposition cases, during the generations which proceeded 
the Pragmática, inter-racial unions and even inter-racial mar­
riages were common, if not quite acceptable. As a consequence, 
after the Royal Pragmática young men and women, often believing 
themselves to be españoles, found their racial purity under 
attack.
Social inequality including inequality of birth and lineage 
was the second most frequent reason for marital opposition. In 
these cases the dissenting parent or guardian attempted to prove 
that one of the bethrothed couple was either an illegitimate 
child or a child born of an illegitimate parent. Maria Antonia 
Martinez, impoverished widow of Alonso Garcia, sargento de 
dragones, denied permission to her son to marry Josefa Mier, 
daughter of a Buenos Aires retail merchant, because she argued 
that Josefa’s mother was born out of wedlock.23 Charges of 
illegitimacy in colonial Argentina were frequent, especially 
since common-law marriages were widespread among all urban groups 
below the elite before 1750 and were still the norm in rural 
areas. The type of illegitimacy, rather than illegitimacy itself 
constituted the nature of o n e ’s social disability. Indeed there 
was a clear distinction between "natural" children, those born to 
an unwed mother and an unwed father who could have married had 
they pleased; and truly "illegitimate" children, those whose 
parents would not have been able to marry because of some canonic 
impediment.24 In colonial society is was far less of a social
burden to be a bastard of "unwed single parents" that it was to 
be the fruit of an adulterous union, an incestous affair, or the 
child of a clergyman.
Still another type of social inequality which was claimed as 
the basis for a marital disenso was distinction between noble and 
plebe. Spanish-born fathers pointed to their hidalguía arguing 
that this set them off from others who although "pure of blood" 
could not make the same claim. This was the argument presented by 
Pedro Medrano, minister of the Royal Hacienda in Buenos Aires to 
deny permission to his son Martin to marry the creole Pascuala 
Iraola.2 5
Personal morality was still another reason for parental dis­
sent. Questionable sexual morals was a charge frequently brought 
against lower class young women but not against me n . 26 Included 
were claims that women had had sexual relations with several men, 
that they were "common prostitutes", that their lovers had con­
tacted venerai disease from them, and that they were publicly 
living with their bethrothed in consensual unions. Arguments 
used against men as a justification for a disenso, included 
charges included thievery, gambling, vagrancy, personal dish­
onesty.27 In the rare case where a father used his daughter’s 
pregnancy as a reason to prevent her marriage, the young man was 
charged not with questionable morality but with seduction.28 
While this charge tended to portray the woman in question as an 
innocent victim, it did little social damage to the m a n ’s reputa­
tion .
An important and acceptable reason to prevent a marriage was 
economic inequality. This was the most frequent argument used 
not only by the mercantile elite of both Buenos Aires and Córdoba 
in refusing to allow their sons and daughters to marry, but also 
the defense presented by small shopowners (almaceneros) and 
artisans. Pedro Ferreira, alternately described as a shopkeeper,
a barowner (pulpero), and a seller of yerba mate, went as far as 
to kidnap his son from the Casa de Santos Ejercicios to prevent 
his marriage to the daughter of an hacendado from a nearly rural 
area. The poverty of the family of the bride-to-be was the pri­
mary reason given for the opposition.29 The economic inequality 
argument always rested on proving that one of the bethrothed was 
from a markedly inferior economic milieu. In addition, proof that 
the groom-to-be was too poor to support a wife could be included 
in an economic inequality opposition.
Whenever possible the dissenting parent tried to present a 
combination of reasons for his/her marriage opposition. Economic 
inequality might also overlap with noble versus plebeian lineage, 
or with the question of legitimacy; social inequality and moral 
misbehavior might both be given as the grounds for a marriage 
opposition. Trying to prevent the marriage of his 24-year-old 
daughter, Dominga, to José Raimundo Navarro de Velazco, Francisco 
Gutiérrez charged that the groom-to-be was racially unequal 
(mulato), a vagrant, of illegitimate birth, economically unable 
to support the bride-to-be, and had furthermore seduced the 
innocent girl.30 In this case the loss of his daughter’s vir­
ginity and her honor meant less to a father than preventing her 
marriage to someone deemed to be socially and economically 
undesirable.
A few marriage dissents were also brought on technical 
grounds created by the Royal Pragmática. According to the 1778 
law, couples could not be bethrothed without having first 
obtained parental permission. In at least two cases, parents 
claimed to be objecting to a forthcoming marriage because their 
offspring had failed to adhere to this regulation.31 Here 
parents, lacking any other legal reason for preventing the mar­
riage, evoked technicalities to delay the marriage, using the 
time to pressure their children to change their plans.
Those marriage opposition cases which originated in the 
Buenos Aires court of first instance differed from those found 
under the Córdoba jurisdiction by the relative importance of the 
four major justifications for attempting to prevent an off­
spring’s marriage. Buenos Aires litigants were far more likely to 
base their cases on the grounds of economic inequality, with 
race, social background and morality being lesser considerations. 
Córdoba cases, on the other hand, put greater stress on racial 
and social inequalities, and relegating economic considerations 
to third place. These differing patterns suggest that porteños, 
experiencing a degree of economic prosperity, were more willing 
to overlook hazy racial antecedents concentrating instead on the 
economic position of the prospective spouse's family. Conversely, 
the cordobeses, inhabitants of a city in economic stagnation, 
concentrated on race and social rank as the critical variables in 
their defense of socio-economic position. Nonetheless it should 
be remembered that both societies were concerned with race, eco­
nomic standing, social position and morality. The difference 
between Buenos Aires and Córdoba was thus one of degree not of 
absolute values.
Depending on the grounds for the marriage dissent, young 
people had a limited choice of strategies available to counter 
the obstacles. In cases of opposition because of race or lineage, 
the most direct and difficult strategy was to present convincing 
testimony, in the form of baptism and marriage certificates, and 
live witnesses to counter the charges. Often this approach was 
impossible because of the rather lackadasical manner in which 
parish registers had been kept.32 Live witnesses, while 
required by law, usually solved little. For each witness who 
claimed that someone’s grandmother was white and a gentlewoman, 
there seemed to be another who would testify for the plaintiff 
that she was a mulata, and a common servant. Indeed, unless we
are willing to believe that many witnesses with no family ties to 
either the plaintiff or defendant were willing to perjure them­
selves, we are struck by the vague racial perceptions of many 
colonial people. It was of course that vagueness and the ability 
for a quadroon or octaroon to pass into Spanish society which 
made these people so dangerous in the eyes of some members of the 
local elite.
Because of the difficulties involved with the direct 
strategy,bethrothed couples often attempted to employ another set 
of tactics. In cases involving racial inequality they often 
attempted to argue that the African blood found in their 
intended’s family was in truth Indian blood, and therefore 
because of Royal legislation on the nobility of the Indians, no 
stygma was involved. This strategy was all the more effective 
if one could prove that the ancestor in question was a noble 
Indian instead of a common yanacona.3 3
Another strategy was the "us too" approach. Here the young 
man or woman admitted the impurity of their intended’s lineage, 
but attempted to prove that they too suffered the same blood 
"stain". Few people in the area were able to offer sound proof of 
their ancestry going back three or four generations, for few were 
the children of Spanish immigrant fathers and mothers.34 Mis­
cegenation had occured to some degree in the lines of many so- 
called "white" families, with race mixture more prevalent as one 
went down the socio-economic scale. In those cases where the 
father had immigrated from Spain, it was the mother’s creole line 
of the family which was fully scrutinized in a search for some 
touch of mulato ancestry. In addition lacunae in parish registers 
could always be used to cast doubt on one’s ancestors. The net 
result' of this strategy, and of the marriage oppositions in gen­
eral, was to uncover family skeletons which had long since been 
buried.
What group or groups in society were most likely to oppose 
the marriage of their offspring? An occupational analysis of the 
head of family for cases brought before the Buenos Aires court of 
first instance shows that the largest group, thirty-nine percent 
of the plaintiffs, were artisans, peones and small landowners. 
These were the poor whites of the colony who had the most fre­
quent social contact with people of mixed-blood, but also a grouj:> 
which believed it had much to lose in allowing its offspring to 
marry into these groups of lower racial and social status. The 
second largest group of plaintiffs (twenty-two percent) were mem­
bers of the merchant elite, usually engaged in suits to stop 
their sons from marrying poor white women. The merchants viewed 
these alliances as being disastrous for the future commercial 
prosperity of their heirs. Military officers account for seven­
teen percent of oppositions, and small shopkeepers another thir­
teen percent. Lastly bureaucrats were the plaintiffs in nine 
peicent of the cases. Grouping individuals by elite and and 
non-elite occupations (merchant, bureaucrat and military 
officers versus artisans, small landowners,and peones), we find 
that forty-four percent of the plaintiffs could be considered 
members of the local elite, while fifty-six percent were, 
although españoles. definitely considered to be among the common 
people. Fear of social or racial contamination was present at 
all levels of white society, but members of the elite also fought 
to protect their offspring from choosing marriage partners w ho 
were grossly economically inferior.
An analysis of the relationship of the plaintiff to the 
defendant shows that most frequently it was the defendant’s 
father, as head of the family, who refused to give permission to 
marry (forty percent). In twenty-seven percent of the cases a 
male tutor or guardian opposed the marriage. This is not sur­
prising in a patriarcial society. What is more significant is
that twenty-seven percent of marital oppositions were initiated 
by widowed mothers, and another six percent by sisters or aunts. 
The relatively large numbers of women involved in preventing the 
marriage of their children is testimony to their interest and 
power, as well as indirect evidence of the considerable number of 
relatively young widows left to provide for their families after 
the death of an older spouse. Their testimony usually alludes to 
the economic difficulties encountered in providing for their 
children, and their determination to fight against a marriage 
which would bring downward social mobility to their family.35
According to the 1778 Royal Cédula which extended the Royal 
Pragmática to the colonies, in the absence of parents or guar­
dians, the state itself could step forward as plaintiff in une­
qual marriages involving those born in Spain. The Rio de la 
Plata material indicates that this was a rare step. Among the 
marriage dissent cases reviewed, only once did the state attempt 
to stop a marriage by initiating the opposition process, no doubt 
in part because the professional ambitions of a local bureaucrat 
who believed he could further his own career by preventing the 
marriage of a Spanish-born silk weaver to a mulata woman.36
In only one case was the prospective bride the defendant 
against the prospective groom.37 It is clear that the groom-to- 
be, after having promised marriage and sired a child, was no 
longer interested in fulfilling his pledge. His defense was that 
he had become engaged believing his intended was an española but 
had since heard rumors to the contrary. Stretching the meaning of 
the Royal Pragmática, he now challenged the woman in question to 
prove that she was not a mulata before a marriage could take 
place.
Did contested choices tend to be those made by male or 
female offspring? A analysis of thirty cases of parental opposi­
tion shows an almost equal division between parents of the man
(16 cases) and parents of the woman (14 cases) and suggests that 
both men and women were making independent choices of marriage 
partners. A review of this sample also shows some interesting 
variations by social group. Among the elite cases the opposition 
was more likely to come from the m a n ’s parents (eleven opposi­
tions initiated by the m a n ’s parents or tutor versus seven by the 
vv'oman ’s). That is, the objection was to the choice of the man 
rather than that of the woman. At the same time as it is clear 
that economically or racially disadvantageous marriages of either 
men or women endangered a family’s status and reputation, 
families seemed to be more on guard against their sons mistakes, 
possibly because their sons had more opportunity to make mis­
takes. In other words, the abovementioned pattern suggests that 
elite men had greater opportunity to meet women from other social 
classes than their more closely guarded sisters.
For the non-elite groups the situation is quite the oppo­
site. Here the parental objection was made more frequently to the 
daughter’s choice rather than the son’s (four cases begun by the 
m a n ’s parents versus seven by the woman’s). While it is somewhat 
hazardous to generalize from this data because of the small num­
ber of cases involved, this difference suggests that while lower 
class Spanish women enjoyed some degree of geographical mobility 
and social independence, they were not encouraged to use this 
freedom to make marriages that frustrated their family’s desire 
to maintain some social position. At the same time, the marriage 
opposition case itself demonstrates the narrow limits of all 
women’s freedom.
Couples involved in marriage dissent cases were anxious to 
reach a verdict as soon as possible, in the hope that their 
planned marriage could soon take place. But their parents or 
guardians often wished to slow down the legal proceedings, bet­
ting that time itself would discourage the young couple. For 
those eager to prevent a marriage, questions of procedure could 
supply welcome ammunition. Delay as a parental strategy was more 
common when it was the m a n ’s parent who opposed the marriage.
Long delays did not endanger the reputation of a young man, but 
they could be most harmful to a young woman, especially in those 
cases where pre-marital pregnancy demanded speed.
In theory speed was of the essence in all cases. The Crown 
realizing the social danger which these cases represented encour­
aged the court of first instance to complete its hearings and 
present a decision within seven days from beginning the case. 
Another seven days was granted to begin an appeal, and the Royal 
Audiencia was to make a final decision within two weeks from 
receiving the case. The total time elapsed between the beginning 
of the initial process and the appeal decision was therefore to 
be one month.3 8
In its desire to complete proceedings within the stipulated 
time period the Cabildo and the Royal Audiencia tried to set time 
limits: defendants were given two to three days to state the 
reason for their opposition to a marriage, and an additional 
three to four days to present witnesses who would verify their 
claims. Nevertheless for a sample of nineteen cases where 
elapsed time can be fully documented the court of first instance 
took an average of 35.75 days to adjudicate a case. Appeal added 
another 53.2 days to the process. Instead of one month, the 
average marriage dissent ran for three months from start to fin­
ish. Moreover whenever a procedurial question was raised in the 
course of an opposition, the case would be slowed down for at 
least another two months. A major jurisdictional question such 
as whether marriage dissent cases involving military men should 
be heard by the civil court could delay the proceedings for up to 
f our months.3 9
The same concern for a woman’s honor can be seen in the few 
cases in which a prospective bride or her parents brought a dis­
enso case because the groom had changed his mind about the 
desirability of the marriage.40 These cases and surviving breach 
of promise cases under eclessiastical jurisdiction suggest both 
the need to save a woman’s honor by going through with marriage 
once formal espousal had been declared, and the importance of 
marriage to a woman’s social standing.
Although a woman’s honor was linked to her virginity, it is 
clear from the marriage dissent cases that a difference was made 
between sexual relations once a couple had become engaged, and 
other liaisons.41 For the masses sexual relations after 
bethrothal were common. Indeed at times there seems to have been 
a confusion in the mind of young women between engagement and 
marriage for both could be public ceremonies which created last­
ing obligations.42 The acceptance of sexual relations between 
espoused persons also explains the large number of women with 
children bringing breach of promise suits. The two cities’ elite 
guarded their daughters more carefully than non-elite families, 
but the suspicion of sexual relations between espoused couples 
seems to have been general.4 3
A woman therefore did not lose her honor as much by giving 
her virginity to the man she was to marry, as she did by failing 
to marry that man. For many of the women involved in these cases, 
losing a marriage dissent was therefore a loss of more than a 
legal case. It could be at one and the same time the loss of 
social position because of "inferior" racial heritage and the 
loss of personal honor. Furthermore, because it was assumed that 
engaged couples had sexual relationships, the woman who failed to 
marry her fiancé (whether or not it was known that she had lost 
her virginity) was assumed to be tarnished, inferior, dish­
onored . 4 4
Presumably, still more dishonored was the woman who had 
prior sexual experiences with another man without promise of mar­
riage. Indeed there was no clear line drawn between this woman 
and a prostitute, for both were considered to bei "worldly, cor­
rupt and lieencious.” 45 Even worse was the woman who kept any of 
the fruits of her scandalous behavior, publically nursing any 
children who might have resulted from their liaison. This behav­
ior was especially reprehensible for it ran counter to the ideal 
of feminine modesty.46 No wonder the parish registers of Córdoba 
and Buenos Aires are full of Spanish "niños expósitos," 
illegitimate children abandoned on the doorsteps of the leading 
citizens of the town.47
Paradoxically there could be still other advantages to 
abandoning a child rather than baptizing him or her as an "hijo 
natural." In a 1794 Royal Cédula, abandoned children who were 
racially white were granted the same civil legal status as legit­
imate children.48 In Buenos Aires at least, this cédula was 
interpreted retroactively and covered expósitos born years ear­
lier.19 In addition as long as an abandoned child appeared to be 
Spanish (by phenotype), he or she would be assumed to be Spanish 
(by genotype), and would be duly registered in the book of 
Spanish baptisms. In the race conscious world of colonial Rio 
de la Plata, it was better to be assumed to be Spanish than to be 
known to be mulatto.50
In addition to information about concepts of honor, the dis­
ensos provide a view of colonial women and their place in society 
as perceived by the social elite. The ideal for Spanish women 
was to be protected, indeed to be subjected to the men of their 
family.51 To protect an unmarried woman, she was never to be 
left alone, even within her own home, for one never knew who 
could enter and what could happen.52 To retain their honor, 
women should not appear in the streets of the city without at
least a servant accompanying them; to be alone in the street was 
a sign of either extreme poverty or prostitution. Indeed adhering 
to the ideal, elite women preferred not to appear before open 
court, requesting instead that the judges and scribes come to 
their homes to question them whenever possible.
The local elite came closest to mirroring faithfully this 
vision of the protected sheltered female, but other social groups 
displayed differing realities, often in stark contrast to the 
ideal. Economic constraints often made it impossible for women 
who thought of themselves as española to conform to the social 
model. White women ran pulperías » and sold tripe and meat, fend­
ing for themselves while their husbands traveled to the estancias 
of the interior to buy cattle.53 Poor whites and mulatas, (who 
by definition did not have to worry about their honor), could be 
found peddling bread, meat pies and other food on public squares. 
Still other sewed, wove linen, spun, or worked as nursemaids 
(amas de leche). White women, both married and single,worked in 
"trabajos mugeriles."54
Other women, usually orphans of the city’s middle groups, 
were placed with respectable older women after the death of their 
mothers, or sent to the Colegio de Niñas Huérfanas.55 Even those 
women, española, legitimate, and brought up in a protected 
environment, found it difficult to make good marriages if they 
were from poor families.56 The society’s conception of social 
position, while based to a large degree on the idea of ethnic 
purity, also included economic dimensions.
Saving a woman’s honor was intimately tied to the honor of 
her family. Indeed the extent to which an individual was tied to 
his or her family, the extent to which o n e ’s conduct was a 
reflection of that family, is made dramatically clear by the mar­
riage dissent cases. Eighteenth century society was organized 
around the family, its social position, and the perservation of
its honor. Because the concept of family was wide, the choice 
of a marriage partner was crucial to not just one’s nuclear fam­
ily, but also to aunts, uncles, cousins and other members of the 
extended kinship group. A bad marriage, a marriage to someone 
beneath one’s social or racial standing could blemish all members 
of o n e ’s family, casting doubt on the entire family’s claim to 
whiteness or hidalguía, and limiting the future marriages of 
first and second cousins, nieces and nephews.57 In the words of 
one witness "equality between the marriage partners is of great 
importance to all the family’s descendents, just like 
nobility."5 8
To protect their family’s honor, parents often tried to use 
force to prevent undesirable marriages. In at least four cases, 
sons were imprisoned, kidnapped or sent out of the city, to sepa­
rate them from their intended brides.59 This type of force was 
not used against daughters in the cases reviewed. Women were, by 
their very nature, assumed to be more docile and maleable, and 
could therefore be more easily contained within the confines of 
their household. Some young men did request that their fiancées 
be removed from their parents domain and placed in "depòsito" so 
as to escape being subjected to undue parental pressure, but this 
was rarely granted by the court because of fear of further 
scandal.60 This attitude of the civil court was in dramatic con­
trast to the earlier willingness of ecclesiastical officials to 
move young women to a safe and neutral ground, a policy which 
safeguarded the exercise of free will concerning marriage part­
ners . 6 1
Young men also ran away from their parents home, usually 
seeking refuge with the family of their bethrothed.62 While this 
strategy might have produced a degree of short-term independence, 
in the long-run it usually provided ammunition for their parents 
in legal proceedings. Furthermore living in the home of their
intended was always interpreted as engaging in wanton sexual 
relations, charges which could be used against the prospective 
bride. In only one case did a woman run away from home, demanding 
that she be deposited in a safe home, but here her motives were 
rather dramatic--to prevent being raped by her stepfather.63
While the tenacity with which many prospective brides and 
grooms fought their parents in the marriage dissent cases, and an 
occasional billet doux included in the court papers, leaves 
little doubt as to the existence of romantic love in the late 
eighteenth century, in the eyes of parents and authorities 
romantic attachments were "dangerous." While young people expe­
rienced romantic love, the duty of those who were older was to 
take a hard, rational look at the social consequences of that 
emotion. Love, passion, and youth had to be controlled for the 
survival of social order.
Both the state and parents would have preferred to avoid the 
question of love and marriage, arranging instead suitable part­
ners for their children. But the continued existence of cases of 
filial challenge to parental choices and parental dissent to 
children’s choices reflects the desire of young people to chose 
their own mates. Regardless of the desirability of parental pro­
tection of their female children, evidence presented in the mar­
riage dissent cases shows that young women were able to meet 
young men, invite them into their homes and begin relationships 
without the knowledge of either or both sets of parents.64
From the point of view of certain colonial parents any free­
dom was dangerous. Mestizaje coupled with geographical mobility 
had produced people who were not easily socially or ethnically 
identifiable, and young people, prone to fall into the trap of 
romantic love were unlikely to be on guard. Those with hazy 
antecedents were seen as an omnipresent threat by others of the
same socio-economic groui>, who no matter how poor could at least 
boast of being pure white. In part this threat was economic, but 
even more important were its social consequences, for marrying 
someone who was racially tainted, someone who by definition 
showed "pernicious qualities and vile extraction" threatened 
future generations.65
The porosity of racial categories coupled with the fear on 
the part of the whites that mulattoes would be successful in 
passing, are illustrated by the case of Juan Bruno, a Spanish- 
born peddlar (tratante), who settled in Córdoba and Eugenia 
Tejada, a street vendor. Although it was never clear whether 
Eugenia was a mulata, a quadroon, or a mestiza, after a lengthy, 
rather public and tempestuous love affair, the couple was married 
by the Church. Hearing of this marriage, the Córdoba cabildo 
devoted an entire session to censuring the couple and forbade 
Eugenia to dress like an española under threat of fine and cor­
poral punishment. This prohibition on dress is especially inter­
esting, for clothing was an essential marker, a way to distin­
guish the whites from the mulattoes and blacks, in a society 
characterized by widespread racial confusion.66 The ferocity 
which which the elite of Cordoban society attacked the couple for 
their marriage, suggests a socio-racial paranoia heightened 
because of the bride’s ability to pass for a white woman, and her 
spirit. Eugenia Tejada was not the first mixed-blood to marry a 
Spaniard. But this marriage represented a dangerous precedent 
because of the bride’s phenotype; the couple therefore had to be 
punished in an exemplary fashion.67
Racial barriers were more difficult to overcome in tradi­
tional societies such as that of Córdoba city than in more 
dynamic Buenos Aires. In the rural backlands of both Buenos Aires 
and Córdoba, poverty and military service tended to lessen racial 
distinctions between españoles and mulattos or mestizos. The
extent to which this melding had occurred can be seen not only in 
the difficulty which witnesses often had in agreeing on a per­
son’s race, but in the rather cavalier fashion in which rural 
parish records were kept. By 1770 priests serving rural parishes 
no longer attempted to enter their flock in ledgers which cor­
responded to race; instead all were inscribed in the baptism and 
marriage books reserved for españoles.6 8 Much the same process 
seems to have gone on in the semi-urban outskirts of the city.
The high level of geographical mobility through the entire 
Buenos Aires-Córdoba area also added to the vagueness of racial 
identification. Indeed this mobility was in part due to the fact 
that by changing residence, one could often also change racial, 
if not social categories.69 It is no accident that the above 
mentioned inter-racial couple, shamed by the Córdoba cabildo, 
quickly left the city, seeking refuge first in the countryside 
near Rio Segundo, and then in Luján, along the Buenos Aires fron­
tier. Juan Bruno, like many others, realized that his wife’s 
life would be better in Buenos Aires, "because in Córdoba, people 
like her are not allowed to be treated like ladies."70 He 
eventually rose to the rank of comandante del rio and 
administrador principal of the town. As the wife of a local offi­
cial and a man who owned a farm (quinta) outside of Buenos Aires, 
Doña Eugenia, while never accepted in the highest spheres of 
porteño society, was nonetheless accorded the respect due an 
española.
The ability to move from one socio-racial group to another 
could be found to a lesser degree in the urban setting. Movement 
was not necessarily upward, and there is some indication that in 
the case of women, not only their social but their racial 
category was determined by their husband’s group. The case of Ana 
Marla Josefa Rodriguez, a poor Spanish woman who married the free
mulatto, Francisco Pozo is instructive.71 In the eyes of the 
census taker, and indeed in society in general, Ana Maria had in 
effect become a mulata herself.72
Parents and tutors refused to give their permission to the 
upcoming marriage of their sons or daughters fully expecting to 
be vindicated in a court of law. Surprisingly the decisions 
reached by the lower and upper courts did not usually support 
parental opposition. Of eighty-three cases heard in Buenos Aires, 
Córdoba or before the Royal Audiencia, the judges found parental 
opposition to be "racional" in twenty-six cases, while their 
decisions favored the marriage of the bethrothed couple in 
thirty-seven cases.73 Although armed with greater power than 
ever to decide in cases touching one of the most personal areas 
of peoples’ lives, judges in the Rio de la Plata tended to insist 
on proof of inequality (the letter of the law) in reaching their 
verdict. Although they reflected the biases of their class, they 
were not neglectful of the law.
In reaching their decision, the court of first instance of 
Buenos Aires tended to find more frequently against the parent oí- 
tutor opposing the marriage than the Córdoba court.74 In addi­
tion nineteen percent of Córdoba’s first instance cases were 
dropped by either the prospective bride or groom before comple­
tion of the court proceedings, while all Buenos Aires cases were 
seen to completion. Both trends suggest a greater degree of 
social and parental intransigence in the more traditional 
society.
In those cases which came to appeal, the Royal Audiencia 
proved to be generally supportive of lower court decisions. Only 
one out of five of the cases appealed to the high court were 
overturned, but in overturning lower court decisions the Audien-
cia proved as likely to go from a decision favoring the child to 
one favoring the parent as the other way around. The Audiencia 
ruled in favor of the parent’s ojjposition in less than one of 
every three cases which it reviewed.
In general the courts paid little attention to extenuating 
circumstances which in earlier times might have hastened mar­
riage. A premarital pregnancy, the need for a "marriage of con­
science which demands quick resolution" little swayed the 
judge.75 Neither did a long-standing union which had already pro­
duced several children.76 While the Church had been ever eager 
(although not always successful) to legitimize unions, the state 
had other priorities. Even in those cases where it was clear that 
an illegitimate union would continue if permission to marry was 
denied, the State defended the concept of equality above all 
else .
Indeed the new state policy vis-a-vis marriage might have 
contributed, at least in part, to driving a high illegitimacy 
rate even higher. Percentage of "white" illegitimate births, as 
high as nineteen percent in the years prior to 1778, gradually 
moved upward, reaching thirty-two percent in the 1780’s. Although 
illegitimate "white" births were never at the same level of 
illegitimate "black" births (the later averaging forty-four per­
cent), the weight now given to parental opposition might have 
dissuaded some people living in consensual unions from even con­
sidering marriage. What is nonetheless clear is that premarital 
or extramarital relations continued to be fairly common.
The marriage opposition verdicts are an important source of 
information on elite perceptions of society. In the case of 
Buenos Aires, the alcalde de primer or segundo voto, the men who 
made the initial determination in the cases were without excep­
tion powerful local merchants. During the years 1785-1805, the 
years In which the aleaIdes tried these cases, all but one of
these aleaIdes were also Spanish-born.77 In essence the way in 
which they applied the law reflected the world-view, and 
priorities of a commercial peninsular-born elite. Needless to 
say application of the Royal Pragmática was not uniform. Indeed 
the tendency of parents or tutors to refuse permission to marry 
on a combination of grounds (i.e., race and economic position), 
along with lacunae in local records and conflicting testimony, 
provided the judges with great latitude in reaching their deci­
sions .
In Buenos Aires, as in Córdoba, the central concept in all 
the marriage dissent cases was that of "equality” ; parents and 
guardians always justified their oppositions because the 
bethrothed were unequal. In a handful of cases the evidence as to 
inequality was clear and overwhelmining, and the alcaldes applied 
the corresponding legislation. But the majority of cases were 
more complex, the evidence more contradictory. In these cases the 
alcaldes of Buenos Aires more than those of Córdoba always con­
sidered economic inequality as a factor, even when neither 
plaintiff or defendant chose to base their case on these grounds. 
Indeed the merchant city fathers of Buenos Aires showed time and 
time again that economic position in porteño society overrode 
race, legitimacy, and upbringing, in difficult cases.
Compare for example the case of Garcia versus Martinez with 
that of Castro y Ulloa versus Rubio.78 In the former case the 
alcalde de primer voto found the parents’ opposition to be 
groundless. Although the bride’s mother was clearly an 
illegitimate child (sufficient reason for claiming inequality of 
birth), her family enjoyed a moderate economic position. In the 
latter ease, the marriage opposition was supported by the Court. 
The bride was española, legitimate, well brought up, but from a 
family "notorious for its poverty," and therefore an unacceptable 
wife for the son of a Cádiz merchant.
N’ot, only did the alcaldes interprete the law to fit their 
conception of equality, they quickly closed ranks when any member 
of the local elite was involved in marriage opposition proceed­
ings. In cases where important merchants, military officers or 
bureaucrats objected to their child’s choice of a marriage part­
ner, they were assured of the support of the alcaldes even when 
the reason for the opposition was as vague as "the groom-to-be is 
from an unknown family."79 In at least two cases the merchant 
alcaldes of Buenos Aires supported their peers when they moved to 
prevent young Spanish clerks from making marriages which would 
have seriously limited their commercial futures.80 While the 
alcaldes were probably acting based on the advice of the 
Cabildo’s legal counsel, this asesor♦ a lawyer by training, 
reflected the same social bias as the judges.
Race and social position were important variables vis-a-vis 
their own group, but the merchant alcaldes were little moved by 
these variables in marriage opposition cases involving others.
The scant interest in race can be seen in the case of Casco 
versus Aramburu, a case in which a chairmaker (si1letero) refused 
to give permission to his daughter to marry a journeyman sil­
versmith (oficial de plateria).81 Although the father’s opposi­
tion was based in part on the race of the groom, the court never- 
gathered testimony on the issue. This did not stop the alcalde 
from declaring the marriage dissent to be without merit. The ver­
dict reflected the social conceptions and prejudices of an elite 
which while defending its own social position and racial purity, 
failed to support poor artisans in their attempt to do the same.
The social standing and occupation of the parent opposing 
the marriage greatly influenced the decision of the local court. 
Merchants were the most successful plaintiffs, winning all oppo­
sition, while small shopkeepers and bureaucrats were only suc­
cessful in fifty percent of the cases involving their children or
wards. Artisans, peones and small landowners won only one-third 
of their marrige oppositions. Military officers fared even less 
well, supported by the court in only twenty-five percent of their 
actions. They were the group most likely to oppose the marriage 
of a child on grounds judged to be "irrational" and 
"authoritarian."8 2
The fact that Cabildo justice tended to reject their argu­
ments based on race did not mean that white artisans calmly 
accepted race mixture for their children. While there seems to 
have been little difference between one artisan and another in 
the eyes of the local elite, the artisans themselves, especially 
those who had immigrated from Spain, fought to maintain them­
selves separate from the mulatto masses.83 The strong racial 
prejudices of the artisans are reflected in several marriage dis­
sent cases, as is their attention to emblems designating race 
and class.84 Indeed the general racial confusion in the Rio de 
la Plata made it all the more important that one be on guard 
against unequal marriages.
In both Buenos Aires and Córdoba, marriage opposition deci­
sions not only reflect the elite’s attitude toward the race vis- 
a-vis the masses, they also show their expectations of sexual 
behavior. For the alcaldes poor girls, regardless of their race, 
were presumed to be sexually experienced past the age of 
puberty. Indeed in the face of evidence to the contrary, the 
judges could not conceive of poor girls maintaining their 
purity.85 Here we ran see the way in which concepts of social 
class reinforced those of sexuality. The poor were by definition 
licentious.
How successful was the Pragmática in preventing the social 
disorder caused by interracial marriage or marriage between 
social unequals? To judge from the cases considered here and from 
later legislation, the Pragmática was less than totally effec-
tive, and eventually more draconian measures were enacted. In 
1805, a Royal cédula prohibited the marriage of any Spaniards 
regardless of his or her age to any casta without the prior 
authorization of the Viceroy or Audiencia.86 Clearly earlier 
legislation had failed to establish order, and it was now time 
for the state to take an even more active role in controlling 
social behavior.
A survey of marriages performed from 1750 to 1810 in three 
of the six parishes in Buenos Aires confirms that the Royal 
Pragmática had an effect which although not total was nonetheless 
important.87 Before 1778, the year of the enactment of the 
Pragmática, the total number of marriages between obvious social 
unequals (marriages between whites and other races or marriages 
between legitimate and illegitimate persons) averaged 23.4 per 
one hundred. The rate of these marriages after 1778 fell to 10.1 
per hundred. Parents and tutors, and platense society as a whole 
increasingly found unequal marriages objectionable, even though 
the courts did not necessarily agree.
The Bourbon Reforms and legislation such as the Royal 
Pragmática served to intensify racial catagorization. Earlier, 
both in urban and in rural areas racial labeling had been vague. 
In a society where many people of mixed race had been able to 
drift from one category to another, where country people could 
migrate to the city changing their occupations and perhaps 
forgetting certain details of their background, people were now 
made increasingly aware of their racial inferiority. Race had 
always been important, but the categories had blurred, and now 
the Royal Pragmática allowed parents and the state to redraw the 
lines once again.
In the Rio de la Plata, the Royal Pragmática tended to 
encourage the tightening of social and racial mobility at the 
very moment when the area as a whole was experiencing economic
and demographic growth. This aspiration to narrow acceptable mar­
riage partners was not without its blatant ironies. Consider for 
example the case of Francisco Ramos, a brick-maker, who married a 
woman reputed to be a mulata in the early 1770's. In 1796 the 
same Francisco Ramos was engaged in a marriage dissent case with 
his son because the latter wanted to marry a woman reputed to be 
a mula ta.s s
Moreover new marriage legislation did not produce a uniform 
degree of reaction throughout the colony. In the case of 
Córdoba, the large number of marriage opposition cases in propor­
tion to the total number of marriages performed suggests that 
inhabitants of urban areas which experienced little or no eco­
nomic expansion were more likely to engage in this type of liti­
gation than those living in zones undergoing economic growth.
This in turn raises the possibility that in economically stagnant 
areas there might have been a greater tendency for people to 
choose prospective mates from among those who were economically 
or racially dissimiliar and/or a greater willingness to challenge 
parental authority to defend that choice.89
In America, the Royal Pragmática of 1776 provided legal 
justification to construct racial and economic barriers in the 
most personal domain, that of family and marriage. Moreover, 
because the legislation was a valid reflection of the social 
philosophy of the times, its effects were felt beyond the 
institution of marriage. Other social and religious organizations 
such as Third Orders, which already practiced a socio-racial dis­
crimination, limiting membership to whites of certain social 
standing, now justified their conduct by turning to the Royal 
Pragmática.90 The Pragmática did not create the attitudes which 
produced social and economic discrimination, but rather 
legitimized already existing prejudices and biases.
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